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Introduction 
Until the Second World War, Norway was a 
country with limited foreign policy traditions and 
experience. Foreign policy and international affairs 
played a subordinate role in public debates, and 
there was little professional or academic expertise 
in the field. The aims of the country's diplomatic 
activity seemed simple: to maintain a distance to 
potential issues and areas of conflict. Norway 
intended to be everybody's friend and nobody's 
foe. Neutralist inclinations b>rew stronger and 
gradually became dominant as tension increased in 
Europe in the latter 1930s. During this period 
Norway's involvement in the League of Nations 
increasingly focused on efforts to restrict the 
compulsory character of the Covenant's Article 
16, i.e. the right and duty of member states to 
participate in sanctions against an aggressor. 
Norway declared its intention to follow a policy of 
formal neutrality in the case of war involving the 
European great powers. 
Behind the policy of non-involvement in great 
power conflict was the conviction that Great 
Britain would, in its own interest, come to Nor-
way's rescue in case of attack from Germany or 
the Soviet Union, the only conceivable aggressors. 
Thus Norway based its security on an "implicit 
guarantee" by, primarily, Great Britain, but Nor-
way's official stance as a non-aligned country 
precluded public declarations to this effect. 1 
In the eyes of most influential Norwegians, the 
German attack on Norway on 9 April 1940 and 
Britain's inability to provide effective military 
assistance had once and for all compromised the 
basic tenets of prewar Norwegian foreign and 
security policies. The need to demonstrate Nor-
way's active commitment to the allied war effort 
and the necessity of starting planning for the future 
made the Norwegians in London rethink the basic 
premises of Norway's security and its foreign 
relations. The need to cultivate relations with all the 
major allies, including the Soviet Union from 22 
June 1941, forced the Norwegian government to 
define Norway's place in the relationship between 
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the three great powers which were likely to play 
leading roles in Europe after the war. 
The policy formulation which started soon after 
the Norwegian government's arrival in London in 
mid-June 1940 included discussions of the basic 
premises of Norway's foreign and security poli-
cies.' From June 1940 to May 1945 the policy of 
the government-in-exile went through three main 
stages. Halvdan Koht, the prewar foreign minister 
who continued in office until he was replaced by 
Trygve Lie in November 1940,3 struggled in vain to 
salvage what was left of prewar neutralism. 
Although it is difficult to reconstruct a complete 
picture of his thinking, he apparently thought that 
Norway should take part in the war against Ger-
many without involving itself in a clear-cut and 
formalised alliance with Great Britain. Trygve Lie, 
on the other hand, from the onset of his tenure as 
minister of foreign affairs saw as his primary task 
the strengthening of Norway's ties to Great Britain 
and the consolidation of its position within the 
alliance. Partly in order to demonstrate and under-
line Norway's break with its neutralist past, he 
introduced his "Atlantic policy", a scheme for 
Atlantic cooperation to be continued and developed 
further when hostilities ended. 
With the rise of the Soviet Union as a major 
partner in the alliance and a power which must be 
included in all planning for the postwar world, the 
"Atlantic policy" gradually receded in Norwegian 
foreign policy declarations. The "Atlantic policy" 
had been conceived when the Soviet Union played 
a subordinate role in Norwegian foreign policy 
considerations. The new balance of forces within 
the alliance, however, forced the Norwegian 
government to retreat from the one-sided western 
political and military orientation inherent in the 
"Atlantic policy". The Norwegians began to think 
in tenns of Norway as a "bridge" between the 
Soviet Union and the two dominant western 
powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
While making less mention of the need for political 
and military cooperation with the "Atlantic powers" 
(Lie had even suggested that the United States 
might wish to establish military bases in Norway 
after the war), Norwegian policy turned gradually 
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towards supporting schemes of global great power 
cooperation. "Bridge-building" succeeded "Atlantic 
policy" as the declared Norwegian foreign policy 
doctrine. 
Aspects of the government's international 
orientation, most markedly the declaration of the 
"Atlantic policy", was criticised and opposed by 
groups of Norwegians abroad and from allied 
governments. Various counterproposals were 
introduced. Isolated neutralism as represented by 
Halvdan Kohl was hardly present in discussions 
after the summer of I 940. lt may be argued, 
however, that elements of the idea survived and 
surfaced with the rise of "bridge-building" and 
global rather than Atlantic commitments as the 
foundations of Norwegian foreign policy. Nordic 
cooperation, as opposed to Atlantic, i.e. great 
power cooperation, continued to appeal to groups 
of Norwegians abroad and also to parts of the 
Home Front leadership in Norway. Schemes of 
Nordic cooperation were often linked to broader 
schemes of European cooperation as propagated 
by Polish premier Wladyslaw Sikorski and Norwe-
gians in Stockholm. 
This article discusses the schemes of European 
and Nordic regional cooperation together with the 
Atlantic policy and the bridge-building ideology as 
they appeared in Norwegian foreign policy discus-
sions during the Second World War. Why did the 
policy-making bodies in London consistently reject 
all ideas of regional solutions in Europe, propagat-
ing either schemes of cooperation with the western 
great powers or "non-allignment" in the form of 
Norway as a "bridge" between the East and the 
West? 
Prewar Norwegian attitudes to Nordic 
and European regional cooperation 
After the First World War Norway opted for 
membership in the newly created League of 
Nations. The decision was far from undisputed in 
Norway; not only the Labour Party argued that 
Norway should continue the policy of neutrality 
which had served its purpose during the First 
World War. Neutrality or non-allignment, it was 
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argued, was incompatible with participation in the 
League of Nations. The conflict between interna-
tional solidarity and commitments, expressed 
through Norway's active participation in Geneva, 
and strong neutralist sentiments, remained a 
characteristic feature of Norwegian foreign policy 
in the interwar period.' Whereas Norwegians 
placed great hopes on the new world organisation 
during the relatively tranquil I 920s, enthusiasm 
waned in inverse ratio to the growth of tension and 
conflict in Europe. In the latter half of the I 930s 
Norway and the other Scandinavian states took the 
lead in attempting to weaken the strength of the 
Covenant's Article 16. Norway and the Nordic 
states also took steps to prepare the ground for 
formal neutrality in case of war. The British 
"implicit guarantee" nevertheless remained the 
cornerstone of its security policies. 
In the interwar period the Scandinavian coun-
tries (from the mid- I 930s including Finland) 
developed a system of frequent and regular consul-
tations on the highest political level. Cooperation in 
economic and cultural matters brought significant 
results, but there was also a high degree of coordi-
nation of their activity in Geneva and of their 
foreign policy in general. In the military field, 
however, collaboration was limited to a few areas 
of peacetime preparation, and the results were 
meagre.' Attempts at staff consultations and 
cooperation in the production and procurement of 
weapons and munitions had few results. In Nor-
way the idea of some sort of Nordic or 
Scandinavian military union or common security 
arrangement found support only in military, and 
some conservative, quarters. Among the leading 
politicians of all the major political parties such 
ideas were rejected out of hand6 Taking into 
account their rejection of Nordic cooperation, it is 
hardly surprising that Norwegians were even more 
negative towards any involvement on the European 
continent. Polish and Baltic attempts, perceived or 
real, to develop contacts with Scandinavian coun-
tries met with no response in Norway. 
The prevailing Norwegian attitudes towards the 
notion of Nordic and European regional coopera-
tion were influenced and reinforced by what they 
perceived to be Soviet preferences. The Norwe-
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gians felt that the Soviet Union disapproved of all 
kinds of regional arrangements in the immediate 
vicinity of their borders.' Halvdan Koht, minister of 
foreign affairs from March 1935, consciously 
played down the significance of his Baltic and 
Polish contacts in order not to antagonise Mos-
cow. This argument reappeared in the wartime 
discussions. 
Summer 1940: reorientation of 
Norwegian foreign policy attitudes 
When the Norwegian government established itself 
in London in June 1940, the attention and criticism 
focused on Halvdan Kohl, minister of foreign 
affairs, who was strongly identified with the 
prewar foreign policy and its ultimate failure. 
Mounting opposition against Koht' s conduct of the 
government's foreign affairs led to his replacement 
by Trygve Lie in November the same year. 
It would be wrong to present Koht as simply 
being in favour of a continuation of the prewar 
policy of neutrality; an obviously non-existent 
alternative at a time of war and emigration. Discus-
sions in the summer of 1940 focused on Norway's 
role in the alliance and the character and scope of 
relations with the United Kingdom as the main 
belligerent power. 
The Soviet Union played an important role in 
Kohl's thinking at this point. If the war ended 
without the allies achieving a clear-cut victory the 
result could be some sort of compromise peace. In 
this situation the Soviets would be in a position to 
exert decisive influence when the shape and order 
of postwar Europe should be decided. lt would 
then obviously be in Norway's interest to be able 
to draw on a reserve of Soviet goodwill and, if 
possible, on a Soviet commitment to restore some 
sort of Norwegian statehood.' Fundamentally 
Kohl's view was based on the assumption that the 
Soviets would be favourably inclined towards a 
Norwegian foreign policy which set limits to the 
wartime cooperation with Great Britain. The 
government-in-exile should therefore stress its 
independent stance, although Koht never argued in 
favour of a complete disentanglement from the 
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allied cause. In this connection it i.s noteworthy 
that Koht, some weeks after his arrival in London, 
took the opportunity to assure I van Maisky, the 
Soviet ambassador to London, that the Norwegians 
had not asked for allied help after the German 
attack. !van Maisky, according to Koht, attached 
due importance to his communication. 9 
The attitude of the foreign minister may be 
further characterised by a remark he reportedly 
made during another interview with the Soviet 
ambassador. According to Maisky, Koht spoke of 
Norway as "still remaining 'neutral' though at war 
with Germany"." Some of the members of the 
Norwegian cabinet were of the opinion that Koht 
wanted Norway to be "a belligerent neutral". The 
minister of justice, Terje Wold, returned on various 
occasions to a discussion of Kohl's views on 
foreign policy in his diary. According to Wold, 
Koht held the view that "our position in relation to 
Russia will be better [ ... ] the less we have to do 
with England"." 
Kohl's opponents rejected his policy of stress-
ing Norway's independence vis-a-vis the British in 
order to preserve and cultivate the Soviet connec-
tion. A memorandum signed in mid-July by a 
group of five intellectuals of the inner circle 
surrounding the government gives a clear picture 
of their thinking.!' "The five" pointed out that all 
attempts at effective wartime cooperation between 
Norway and its allies would be seriously hampered 
if Norway prepared for the worst alternative by 
building up its relations with a great power which 
was supporting the allies' adversary in the war. 
Norway must avoid being suspected of cultivating 
friendship with "the foe of its ally". This argument 
went to the core of Kohl's foreign policy doctrine, 
and "the five" were probably hinting at the foreign 
minister's conversation with I van Maisky a few 
days earlier. Secondly, "the five" argued that the 
Soviet Union, because it did not want to see 
Norway completely dominated by Great Britain, 
must view favourably all attempts to make Norway 
an active participant in the war. A policy of active 
cooperation with the allied powers in the struggle 
for the allied cause was Norway's only chance of 
asserting the country's position as a sovereign 
power, thereby avoiding "complete dependence on 
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England in case of a German defeat". Summing up: 
the principal concern of "the five" was the neces-
sity of developing a more active and whole-hearted 
cooperation with the British. 
Trygve Lie and the introduction 
of the "Atlantic Policy" 
Trygve Lie's instalment in office as minister of 
foreign affairs in November 1940 signalled a 
radical departure from the "Kohl doctrine" in 
Norwegian foreign policy. The new foreign policy 
philosophy, presented as "the Atlantic Ocean 
policy", or simply the "Atlantic policy", repre-
sented a fundamental departure from the traditional 
Norwegian policy of maintaining a distance to great 
power politics. Some isolated voices, for instance 
the Norwegian envoy to Moscow, Einar Maseng, 
continued to argue in favour of a more "indepen-
dent" foreign policy line. For the time being, 
however, the representatives of the old line of 
neutrality had lost their influence. 
Lie developed the idea of Atlantic cooperation in 
a series of speeches and articles commencing in 
the autumn of 1940. The general idea of continuing 
cooperation between the allies after the war might 
seem a logical outcome of the new solidarity and 
realisation of common interests among the great 
and small comrades-in-arms. It is equally obvious 
that the introduction of the "Atlantic policy" was 
partly motivated by the acutely felt need to enhance 
Norway's standing as a fully committed member 
of the alliance. Of greater interest is the operational 
content Lie gave his ideas even at this early stage 
of their elaboration. He wanted to offer Great 
Britain and the USA military bases in Norway even 
in times of peace. Lie aired this idea for the first 
time in the autumn of 1940 when he was still 
minister of supplies and returned to it on several 
occasions in the following years. This shows that 
the new foreign minister and his advisers had a 
frame of reference that differed radically from the 
dominant prewar doctrine." 
The first to introduce Lie to the idea of Atlantic 
military-political cooperation was Or Arnold 
RFstad, a specialist in international law and an 
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adviser to the Norwegian government in matters of 
foreign policy. 14 Rrestad was concerned with 
creating a set of "security combines" which 
together would be strong enough to eliminate the 
possibility of renewed aggression on the part of 
Germany or Japan. 15 Rrestad made no hints about 
having to safeguard against Soviet expansion as 
well. The area of responsibility of each of the 
"combines", together with its system of military 
bases, was to constitute "a strategically complete 
field of defensive operations". 16 In Rrestad's 
opinion, the countries bordering on the North 
Atlantic constituted such a regional entity, and he 
consequently argued in favour of the creation of a 
"North Atlantic Security Combine". 17 Neither a 
purely European nor a Nordic system would be 
strong enough to give Norway the sufficient 
degree of security against aggression from an 
expansionist great power. Within the framework of 
each of the regional organisations should be 
created "a permanent military machinery, suffici-
ently manned and alertly watched", which was to 
dispose of "massed air and sea forces". 18 
The "Atlantic policy" was not unequivocally 
welcomed among the allies or influential Norwe-
gians at home and abroad. British and American 
reactions were cautious and uncommitted. They 
did not reject the idea, but were unwilling to enter 
into discussions of its practical implementation. 
The Home Front leaders in Norway were highly 
sceptical about the idea of giving priority to coop-
eration with the great powers rather than with 
Sweden and the other Nordic neighbours. They 
also stressed the importance of the coming world 
organisation, and emphasised the necessity of 
including the Soviet Union in any future security 
arrangement in the region. 1' Yet another challenge 
to the foreign policy orientation of the Norwegian 
government was introduced by the Polish govern-
ment-in-exile of General Wladyslaw Sikorski. 
Wladyslaw Sikorski and the idea of 
a Central European Confederation 
Early in the war the new Polish government 
revived the idea of a Central European confedera-
tion, made up of Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
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possibly other countries "with which the vital 
interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are linked 
up"." Continuing prewar Polish foreign minister 
J6zefBeck's political thinking, Sikorski's idea was 
to create "a politically solid bloc of Slav states 
extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the 
Adriatic"." The Polish-Czechoslovak confederation 
was envisaged as the core of a Central European 
system of cooperation between states. Discussions 
between Eduard Benes and Sikorski began in 
October 1939, and on 11 November 1940 the two 
governments declared that Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia after the war would enter as independent and 
sovereign States into a closer political and eco-
nomic association, which would become the basis 
of a new order in Central Europe, and a guarantee 
of its stability." 
Although negotiations between the Poles and 
the Czechoslovaks continued until 1942, the plans 
for a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation ultimately 
failed. This failure was due to the two countries' 
divergent attitudes towards the Soviet Union, their 
conflicting ideas about !he nature of the proposed 
confederation, and a virtual Soviet veto on the plan. 
A declaration of23 January 1942, outlining the 
basic principles of !he confederation, did not 
receive Benes' signature, and turned out to be the 
climax of the Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations. 
Relations between the two governments became 
increasingly strained. 
The Norwegians were alarmed at the idea of a 
"central zone" in Europe, although Norway was 
hardly designated as a participant in the system. 
What was it then that motivated the Norwegian to 
resist Sikorski's scheme for the solution of the 
security problem of eastern continental Europe, a 
scheme which only indirectly touched Norwegian 
interests? 
When the Norwegians in London discussed 
Sikorski's ideas in beginning of 1942, they did not 
rule out their future realisation in some form or 
other." Neither did they doubt their basic anti-
Soviet leaning. They were therefore convinced -
and rightly so - that the Soviets would oppose 
schemes of small state cooperation in the eastern 
part of Europe. In the short term, therefore, the 
Norwegians felt that a discussion of the Polish 
scheme would expose the alliance to additional 
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strain.:24 In a longer perspective, the scheme 
threatened to add an element of friction between 
the Atlantic great powers and the Soviet Union in 
postwar Europe. Thus, the Norwegians based their 
opposition to Sikorski 's ideas of a unified Central 
Europe on a fundamentally correct evaluation of 
the ultimate Polish motives for launching the 
project: the Poles were concerned wilh creating 
security for the Central European countries against 
both the Soviet Union and Germany. At the same 
time the Norwegians were unable or unwilling to 
take into account specific Central European 
security concerns, and evaluated the plan primarily 
within the context of future East-West great power 
relations. The Poles thought of small state coopera-
tion as a means to counter possible future Soviet 
and German demands. The Norwegian govern-
ment, on the other hand, consistently rejected 
participation in schemes of cooperation which the 
Soviets might perceive as being directed against 
themselves. 
The Atlantic policy was conceived as a system 
based on the participation of Great Britain and the 
United States, within which smaller states would 
inevitably act as junior partners. The Norwegian 
government felt !hat the Polish ideas about small 
and medium state cooperation pointed in the 
opposite direction, by emphasising small state 
cooperation and independence from the great 
powers in matters of security. Their reasoning was 
never made explicit, but it appears that the Norwe-
gian government perceived Sikorski's schemes as 
competing with their own Atlantic proposals. They 
were anxious Jest the Polish ideas should receive 
support in British and American circles and thereby 
weaken their own favoured scheme for Atlantic 
cooperation. After the war Lie argued rather 
unconvincingly !hat the Poles feared that the 
Norwegian "Atlantic" initiatives would impair 
Poland's position in the alliance, which was why 
the Poles launched their own initiatives." 
Military-strategic factors pulled in the same 
direction. Norway's position as an Atlantic power, 
its sparse population and its Jack of an industrial 
base for large-scale production of military equip-
ment and weapons, made the country fundamen-
tally dependent upon the Atlantic powers, Great 
Britain and the USA, for its security. Thus the 
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pursuit of credible guarantees of support from the 
western great powers remained the core of Lie's 
Atlantic policy, and plans for the future organi-
sation of central Europe were naturally peripheral 
to the primary interests of the Norwegian govern-
ment. 
The Norwegian hostility to schemes of exclu-
sive cooperation between smaller states, and the 
concomitant awareness of possible Soviet misgiv-
ings, were revealed when General Sikorski in 
January 1942 proposed drafting a declaration of 
the exiled governments, outlining their position 
with regard to the postwar order in Europe. The 
ostensible primary purpose of the declaration was 
to reach agreement on a joint policy towards 
postwar Germany. 26 
Lie was far from enthusiastic. He pointed out to 
General Sikorski that Norway's interests were 
"mostly directed towards the West", and that any 
scheme for postwar cooperation had to be dis-
cussed with the great powers - Great Britain, USA, 
the Soviet Union and- China." In conversations 
with the British and the Americans he pointed out 
that Norway favoured cooperation with Great 
Britain and the United States, while the Polish plans 
seemed to be inspired by an ideology of small 
power cooperation. 28 
Lie's most direct concern, however, was the 
reaction of the Russians. When J6zefRetinger, 
who was one of Sikorski's closest advisers, 
returned to the proposal a week after Sikorski first 
presented the idea, Lie was still of the opinion that 
the whole project was rather nebulous and lacking 
in constructive purpose. He told Retinger that the 
Norwegian government would not participate in an 
action that could "incite Russian suspicions".29 Lest 
the affair should trouble Norway's reasonably 
good relations with the Soviet government, Lie told 
Alexandr Y. Bogomolov, Soviet minister to the 
governments-in-exile in London, that he had been 
approached by the Poles, but that the Norwegian 
government was sceptical about the idea.30 
Nothing came of the planned small state decla-
ration. Trygve Lie, who never suffered from 
excessive modesty, accorded to himself a major 
role in blocking the idea. In a letter to the Norwe-
gian minister to Moscow, Rolf Andvord, Lie 
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emphasised that he had taken an "initiative" and 
done "what [he] could" to obstruct Sikorski's 
proposal, thereby preventing the formation of "an 
anti-Russian coalition of small occupied states".31 
The Nordic alternative 
Norway would not have been directly affected by 
the Polish plans for Central European cooperation, 
and the aborted declaration of the occupied states 
in Europe remained a minor episode in the history 
of the alliance. Trygve Lie certainly exaggerated his 
own role in preventing the realisation of Sikorski's 
plan. Nevertheless, the Russians were pleased with 
the Norwegian attitude. In April 1943 Bogomolov 
told a member of the Norwegian cabinet that the 
Soviet government was aware that Norway wanted 
cordial relations with the Soviet Union: 
He [i.e. Bogomolov] added that the Soviet 
government had noticed with satisfaction that 
the Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian governments 
had distanced themselves from the Polish 
intrigues, which were directed against the 
Soviet Union. 32 
Lie's emotional engagement and Bogomolov's 
praise notwithstanding, Norway played a peripheral 
role in Sikorski's plans for European cooperation. 
The Nordic alternative, which became the object of 
heated Swedish-Norwegian discussions in the 
spring and early summer of 1942, presented a 
more conceivable alternative in terms of Norway's 
postwar foreign policy and security orientation. 
The Norwegians in Stockholm, centred around 
Labour party leader Martin Tranmrel, voiced the 
most clearly expressed opposition to the Atlantic 
orientation of the London government. Signs of 
diverging views also emanated from the leadership 
of the Home Front in Norway, and there were 
significant differences of opinion within the 
government itself." 
Beginning in the winter of 1942 there was a 
discussion about the nature of future Nordic 
cooperation in the Swedish, Norwegian (London), 
and to some degree British press. The argument 
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culminated in a harsh attack on the Swedish point 
of view in the official Norwegian newspaper Norsk 
Tidend on 15 July." The Norwegians were ex-
tremely upset when Sir Stafford Cripps came out 
in support of the idea of a future Scandinavian 
"federation" in an interview in the Swedish weekly 
Vecko-Journalen,35 and were also alarmed by the 
appearance in Sweden of a booklet titled Nordens 
Forente Staler (The United States of the North)." 
The preparation and discussions in the government 
in April and May 1942 of the policy document 
"Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk" ("The princi-
pal features of Norway's foreign policy") were 
partly motivated by the need to present the Norwe-
gian point of view in face of the propagation of a 
''Nordic" solution.37 
The strained relationship between the two 
governments during the two years following the 
German attack on Norway complicated any talk of 
postwar Norwegian-Swedish cooperation. In 
Norwegian circles in London there was a wide-
spread feeling of bitterness towards the Swedish 
government, resulting from what the Norwegians 
regarded as excessive Swedish accommodation to 
German demands. Of equal importance was the 
need to demonstrate Norway's uncompromising 
stand as a member of the fighting alliance - consid-
erations of alliance commitments and solidarity 
were always present in the foreign policy thinking 
of the Norwegian government during the war. 
After Lie took over as foreign minister in Novem-
ber 1940, he introduced the "Atlantic policy" partly 
to dissociate his own foreign policy from the 
neutrality oriented approach of his predecessor 
Halvdan Koht. Lie felt that an open discussion 
during the war of a future partnership between 
Norway and the neutral Sweden would cause the 
western powers to question the sincerity of 
Norway's Atlantic commitment. Finland's partici-
pation in the war against the Soviet Union - and 
Finland was traditionally closer to Sweden than to 
Norway - also contributed to the erosion of the 
traditional feeling ofNordic unity and solidarity, 
and made easier the transition to an Atlantic, or 
great power, orientation. 
Nonetheless, the Norwegian government's 
attitude to future Nordic cooperation reflected a 
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fundamental reorientation of Norwegian foreign 
policy. The experiences of war and occupation 
tended to place security concerns uppermost in 
government planning for Norway's place in the 
postwar world. Any schemes of Nordic coopera-
tion, according to the propagators of the Atlantic 
policy, would not suffice to give Norway an 
acceptable level of security. Arne Ording, an 
influential advisor to Lie in London, argued that 
basing Norway's security policy on schemes of 
Nordic cooperation would mean the continuation 
of the prewar policy of non-alignment. No group 
of smaller states would be able to keep out of a 
future conflict between the great powers, if only 
one of the belligerent parties found reason to draw 
their territories into the conflict. There could be no 
real security for small states except in cooperation 
with one or more of the great powers. The ques-
tion was not whether Norway should engage in 
cooperation with other powers, but with whom to 
cooperate, and whether to undertake joint prepara-
tions for war in times of peace." 
There was general agreement about the need to 
seek security for Norway in cooperation with other 
countries. Lie favoured military cooperation with, 
principally, Great Britain and the USA. Sweden's 
and Denmark's adherence to an Atlantic system 
would be welcomed, without being essential. 
Tranmrel and the group in Stockholm, on the other 
hand, viewed a Scandinavian bloc as the northern 
link in a set of European regional systems. They 
too rejected participation in a neutral Nordic bloc 
as an option for Norway after the war, if neutrality 
implied the rejection of any form of security 
arrangement with groups of states outside Scandi-
navia and Finland. As opposed to the Norwegians 
in London, they viewed future Norwegian and 
Nordic foreign policies primarily in the context of 
an extensive system of European cooperation, 
within which the smaller powers would together 
seek security in regional arrangements. The 
Stockholm group accordingly rejected exclusive 
reliance on the Atlantic great powers for support 
and security. 
The Swedish arguments in favour of a neutral 
Nordic bloc were rejected out of hand in London. 
Such a solution, for one thing, seemed to guarantee 
11 
Sweden a dominant position - and the Norwegians 
were extremely apprehensive about possible 
Swedish motives and objectives." But the London 
Norwegians' opposition to the Swedish point of 
view was also of a more fundamental nature: the 
option of a Nordic bloc independent of great power 
support directly contradicted the security arrange-
ment that the government preferred. 
Arne Ording also suspected the Swedes of 
preferring some sort of Soviet-German balance of 
power in the Baltic area,40 while the Norwegians 
based their policy planning on a definitive allied 
victory, which would leave the Soviet Union as the 
only remaining great power in that region. During 
the war the Norwegian government could not 
engage in discussions about a future Nordic 
system which could be expected to assume a 
"neutral" position between the Soviet Union and 
Germany. 
For all these reasons, the Norwegian govern-
ment was extremely sensitive whenever they felt 
that the question of Nordic cooperation gained 
some degree of consideration or acceptance in the 
alliance. Lie therefore protested to the British when 
Sir Stafford Cripps in the interview in Vecko-
Journalen expressed support for the idea of a 
future "Scandinavian federation", powerful enough 
to allow the Scandinavian countries to remain 
independent of great power support.41 
"The principal features of Norway's foreign 
policy" discussed the nature of the future relations 
between the Scandinavian states only iil general 
terms, but rejected out of hand the idea of a Nordic 
"bloc" conducting foreign and military affairs 
jointly. The emphasis in the document was on 
Atlantic cooperation and participation in a new 
global security organisation. 
The group in Stockholm, on the other hand, 
held that "the western orientation should not be at 
the expense of the Nordic cooperation"." They felt 
that Norway must avoid the position of a power-
less junior partner in an alliance of great powers. 
Anders Frihagen, a member of the cabinet who 
openly supported the Nordic orientation, expressed 
this point of view in a letter to prime minister 
Johan Nygaardsvold: "A strongly[ ... ] united North 
will be a real power factor. In isolation we will be 
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completely dependent on one of the great pow-
ers. "43 Martin Tranmrel made the same case in 
letters to Lie and Nygaardsvold." The group in 
Stockholm did not object to the idea of continued 
security cooperation with the western powers after 
the war, but were of the opinion that only a united 
North would be in a position to play an independent 
role in a security arrangement with great power 
participation. 
Tranmrel and the group in Stockholm did not 
elaborate in any detail their vision of future 
Scandinavian or Nordic cooperation, but their 
thinking pointed in the direction of cooperation in 
security and economic affairs, which could 
gradually develop into "a possible Nordic union of 
states"." The nature of this hypothetical Nordic 
union was left open. The concept at this stage 
hardly constituted more than a policy statement 
couched in very general terms. It shows, however, 
that the Norwegians in Stockholm envisioned far-
reaching Nordic or Scandinavian military, eco-
nomic and political cooperation in the future. In a 
letter to Trygve Lie in August I 942, Tranmrel 
reiterated that a Nordic defence union, and coop-
eration in economic and foreign affairs, could be 
the first steps towards a political union." 
The Norwegians in Stockholm were aware that 
Nordic cooperation would be complicated by a 
number of factors: fear of Swedish domination; the 
uncertain future status of Finland; Denmark's 
strategic dependence on the dominant power in 
continental Western Europe. All these factors made 
the idea seem risky. A vision of a united North as 
an element in a postwar European system of 
federations or confederations motivated Tranmrel 
and the Stockholm group to pursue the idea despite 
these obvious difficulties. Nordic cooperation was 
"one step" towards a "rational" European order of 
regional units, which might ultimately be trans-
formed into some sort of "United States of Eu-
rope"." Nordic cooperation, according to 
"Diskusjonsgrunnlag om vilre fredsmill", a docu-
ment of June 1942 which expressed the views of 
the Stockholm group, could exist and develop only 
"in a broader European and international context". 
Although the Norwegians in Stockholm supported 
the idea of a global security organisation, they 
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maintained that the world organisation must be 
supplemented by regional groupings of countries. 
They envisaged "very far-reaching" forms of 
cooperation within the "federations or unions", and 
the future world organisation should be based on 
regional agreements.48 
Tranmrel argued that foundations of a federal 
organisation of Europe must be laid during the 
war." "Diskusjonsgrunnlag" praised the idea of a 
Central European confederation of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia with the possible participation of 
Roumania and Hungary. The document further 
envisaged a "federation" of the Balkans, and a 
system of close cooperation between the Nether-
lands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Germany, 
France and Italy were expected to assume their 
traditional role of regional great powers. 
The Norwegian government in London, on the 
other hand, was of the opinion that Norwegian 
participation in a European system of small state 
cooperation might complicate the country's 
relations with the Soviet Union, and quoted Soviet 
opposition as one reason to reject the idea. Al-
though the Norwegians in London were concerned 
about possible Soviet territorial or other demands 
on Norway in the future, considerations of alliance 
solidarity made them play down these concerns, 
and government papers and discussions of Nor-
way's future foreign policy and security orientation 
barely touched the topic.50 The Norwegians in 
Stockholm were more outspoken in their fear of an 
expansionist or imperialist Soviet foreign policy 
after the war. Tranmrel pointed out the· need of 
creating a "balance of power" on the European 
continent, rejecting the idea of placing Germany 
under occupation and stripping the country of its 
armed forces after an allied victory. Tranmrel 
perceived clearly the need to create a counterpoise 
to the Soviet Union on the European continent: 
[ ... ] what is the alternative to a real Germany? 
Should the Soviet Union be allowed to become 
the supremely dominant great power on the 
European continent? Don 'tthey understand in 
London the dangers inherent in this massing of 
power around Stalin's imperialist bolshevism?51 
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Tranmrel was pessimistic about Norway's chances 
of remaining on good terms with the Soviet Union 
after the war. Soviet foreign policy would reflect 
"harsh realities", and he expected Germany to 
present less of a problem than the Soviet Union. sz 
Anders Frihagen argued that defence against a 
possible future Soviet attack from the east de-
manded cooperation with Sweden and Finland, 
while Lie's system of Atlantic cooperation prima-
rily aimed at defending Norway's coast line. 
Frihagen also accorded importance to Finland as a 
"barrier against Russia".53 
The Soviet Union in Norwegian 
wartime foreign policy planning 
The "Atlantic policy" was conceived and originally 
propagated when the anti-Hitler coalition was still 
dominated by Great Britain, heavily supported by 
the United States. The growing stature of the 
Soviet Union in the alliance after its entry into the 
war soon began to challenge some of the basic 
assumptions behind the Atlantic policy. 
The Norwegians did not envisage that their 
scheme for Atlantic cooperation should include the 
Soviet Union. In fact, in the early war years 
Norwegian foreign policy thinking seemed largely 
to ignore the existence and potential of the Soviet 
Union. In the final years of the war, however, 
planning for the future could no longer disregard 
the Soviet Union. 
The dilemma was highlighted in the autumn of 
1942 when the Soviets signalled that they might 
demand a role in a future North Atlantic security 
system. Lie was far from delighted. "If only", he 
told Laurence Collier, British ambassador to the 
Norwegian government, "your authorities had not 
taken such a long time to consider my original 
proposals, we might have avoided this danger".54 
Although the "Atlantic policy" was primarily 
designed to safeguard against a renewed threat 
from Germany, after June 1941 Lie and his advis-
ers made it clear on occasions that some sort of 
Atlantic regional cooperation could be needed to 
safeguard against Soviet territorial claims as well. 
Traditional Norwegian "russophobia", fear of 
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Soviet designs on Spitsbergen, rumours that the 
Soviets wanted a "free port" in Northern Norway, 
and the possible Soviet role in the liberation of 
Norway all served to increase Norwegian fear and 
apprehension. In November 1941 Lie alluded to a 
possible future Soviet threat during a conversation 
with the Dutch and Belgian ministers offoreign 
affairs. He indicated Norway's primarily western 
orientation, and added that 
Germany is not necessarily the only possible 
source of threat to Europe. Even though the 
Soviet Union has declared that it has no 
territorial demands [on Norway], Russia's 
policy towards Finland in the last years points 
in a western direction, and it has been written 
that Russia would like to have a port on the 
Atlantic. 55 
If this was part of the motivation behind Lie's 
Atlantic policy, it could hardly have been the inten-
tions of the Norwegian government to include the 
Soviet Union in the system. He had been thinking of 
Russia, Lie told Eden at about the same time, 
but he did not want Russia in the North Atlan-
tic; though he also thought Russia would want 
to be there. Part of his purpose in proposing an 
Anglo-Norwegian and, if possible, American 
defensive plan for the North Atlantic was to be 
all prepared were Russia to present any de-
mands.56 
Arne Ording argued along similar lines, pointing to 
the exposed position of Northern Norway in 
particular if the Soviets should instigate an aggres-
sive Soviet foreign policy leading to "a new period 
of arms race and formation of alliances". Ording 
concluded that only Great Britain and the USA 
were in a position to provide security for Norwe-
gian independence. "No other form of absolute 
security exists, at least not in the foreseeable 
future."" An official committee planning Nor-
way's postwar defence concluded in March 1942 
that an the Soviets might resume an aggressive 
policy after the war. Norway's defence would 
consequently have to be planned with an eye to 
this alternative as well." 
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The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was aware of the possibility of Soviet objections 
to Norway's participation in a western-domi-
nated defence system in the Atlantic. Arne 
Ording, commenting in June 1942 upon a Dutch 
proposal of similar content, indicated Norway's 
special position vis-B-vis the Soviet Union. After 
the war and as the result of Soviet-Finnish 
peace treaty, Norway and the Soviet Union 
would in all probability become direct neigh-
bours. Ording did not exclude the possibility that 
the Soviets might approve of Norwegian partici-
pation in a defence system together with Great 
Britain and the USA. "This is, however", Ording 
continued, "the most sensitive question arising 
as a result of the proposed agreement". 
The British Foreign Office was acutely aware 
that the Soviet Union was likely to put obstacles 
in the way of the realisation of Lie's plans for a 
North Atlantic defence system. The Russians 
were expected to raise objections to discussions 
of the plan between Norway and the western 
powers unless the Soviets participated. Eden 
emphasised the need to avoid elements of 
friction in the relations between the great po-
wers." Consequently, the Soviet Union must be 
invited to participate in the discussions, though 
Eden feared that its contribution would be 
"entirely destructive": 
It is probable that !heir [i.e. The Soviet Un-
ion's] line would be that it is also a Russian 
interest to participate in the defence of the 
Atlantic, and that for this purpose Russia must 
have an ice-free base in Nonhern Norway. 60 
A speech by the South African Field Marshal! Jan 
Christiaan Smuts in November 1943 provoked a 
discussion about certain aspects of Norwegian 
foreign policy. It throws light on the implications 
of Lie's Atlantic policy. Smuts argued in favour of 
organising close cooperation between Great Britain 
and the other West European countries, in order to 
counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union and 
the United States by shaping a "trinity" of forces.61 
An editorial in Norsk Tidend objected to this part of 
Smuts' speech. Smuts, the paper held, was 
obviously influenced by the ideology of"balance of 
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power and spheres of interest". Norsk Tidend had 
to admit, however, that Smuts' scheme bore some 
resemblance to the Norwegian Atlantic policy. But 
it was argued that the resemblance was a superfi-
cial one, because the Norwegian schemes had 
always envisaged American participation, and the 
planned defence system in the North Atlantic was, 
according to Norsk Tidend, to be organised "in 
intimate cooperation with the Soviet Union".62 This 
last part of the argument, as we have seen, was 
hardly part ofthe rationale behind the "Atlantic 
policy". 
The article in the official Norwegian newspaper 
was precipitated by a conversation on the matter 
between Lie and Collier. The Norwegian minister 
of foreign affairs deplored the public presentation 
of the idea of grouping smaller West European 
states around Great Britain. According to Lie, such 
plans were bound to incite Soviet suspicions. 
Lie went on to say that there were now more 
signs [ ... ]that/he Russians would be likely to 
take a suspicious and unhealthy interest in 
Norwegian foreign policy, if it showed signs of 
linking up with that of this country and that of 
America. [ ... ] 
He did not himself actually fear Russian 
territorial designs on any part ofNonvay; but 
he didfem·thatthe Soviet Government might 
try, for reasons of their own, to prevent the 
Norwegian Government.fi'om conducting their 
foreign affairs in the way in which he would 
like to see them conducted, and that was the 
main reason why he regrel/ed the publication of 
Smuts' speech 63 
Lie's statement provoked an exchange of opinions 
within the British Foreign Office. One official held 
the view that the statement was contradictory to 
Lie's own cherished idea: the Atlantic Ocean 
policy, which would involve Norway in close 
collaboration with Great Britain and the United 
States: "If Mr. Lie is afraid of Norway taking this 
course, then why does he proclaim [ ... ] in favour 
of it?" It was held that the rising power of the 
Soviet Union had obviously forced Lie to change 
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his mind. The only commentator who felt that 
Lie's statement did not signizy a change of his 
views was G.M. Gathome-Hardy. He maintained 
that from the vel)' introduction of the idea the 
Soviet Union had been ascribed a role in the North 
Atlantic cooperation. In his opinion the Norwegians 
were particularly opposed to the idea of creating a 
third bloc to counterbalance the power of the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
In the Foreign Office, Lie's rejection of Smuts' 
ideas was seen as yet another sign of a growing 
Norwegian fear that the Russians had their own 
designs for Northern Norway. This anxiety might 
dispose the Norwegian government towards 
downgrading its advocacy of the Atlantic policy, 
which would in fact imply some sort of alliance 
between Norway and Great Britain and the United 
States." 
At approximately the same time, Lie, in a 
conversation with Collier, left the impression that 
the idea of an Atlantic security system was not 
abandoned at all. After the signing of the Soviet-
Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, mutual assist-
ance and postwar cooperation on I 2 December 
!943, Lie feared that the Soviet government might 
demand a similar agreement with Norway. He 
continued his argument: 
He would not like such a request to come fi'om 
the Russians before agreement had been 
reached with the British and the Americans on 
the question of Atlantic security, and he 
thought we might not like it either. 65 
The British, however, were bent on avoiding any 
discussion of Lie's Atlantic projects. The Norwe-
gian minister of foreign affairs was accordingly to 
be told to shelve the idea of Atlantic defence for 
the moment.66 
At this point, the Atlantic policy was no longer 
an expression of the official foreign policy doctrine 
of the Norwegian government. The Norwegians 
continued, however, to argue in favour of an 
Atlantic regional arrangement within the frame-
work of the future worldwide security organisa-
tion. As late as April I 944, Norsk Tidend, obvi-
ously expressing the government's official view, 
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argued that Norway wanted to participate in a 
defence system together with the Atlantic powers, 
although "with the consent of the Soviet Union". 
Norsk Tidend knew perfectly well that the idea of 
regional arrangements was not unequivocally 
endorsed: 
In some quarters there has been fear that a 
system of regional cooperation thus envisaged 
might give rise to spheres of influence and 
alliances. But this will depend completely on 
the degree of cooperation between the great 
powers. If this succeeds, the great powers will 
have no need for spheres of influence, and 
regional security agreements will not have the 
character of alliances, but will serve as a 
supplement to the obligations within the frame-
work of the international organisation." 
Until the end of the war and the conference in San 
Francisco in the spring of 1945, official proclama-
tions of Norwegian foreign policy views were 
increasingly adamant in their support of the ideas 
underlying the new world organisation. The 
emphasis on an Atlantic regional agreement was 
correspondingly downgraded. Towards the end of 
the war it was admitted that such an agreement 
might constitute an element of tension between the 
great powers. Nonetheless, the Norwegians 
continued to assert the interest of the small states 
in regional systems with great power participation, 
within the framework of the incipient "United 
Nations Organisation"." The main currents of 
Norwegian foreign policy during the period from 
Dumbarton Oaks to the Conference in San Fran-
cisco were marked, however, by the Norwegian 
government's willingness to support every attempt 
to solidify and further develop the cooperation 
between the great powers.69 
The declaration towards the end of the war of 
"bridge-building" as the Norwegian foreign policy 
doctrine did not mean that the Atlantic orientation 
was abandoned altogether. Trygve Lie himself 
apparently never became a fully convinced bridge 
builder. In October 1944 he told ambassador 
Lebedev that the Norwegian government had 
deliberately chosen to avoid propagating the idea of 
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Atlantic cooperation after the Soviets had voiced 
their opposition to the idea if the Soviet Union were 
not invited to take part in the system. 70 But the 
Norwegian attitude "as to the necessity and advan-
tage of a regional agreement between the Atlantic 
countries, now called Western Europe, has surely 
not changed"." Although Norwegian foreign policy 
remained highly ambiguous when the Atlantic 
policy gradually receded, the declaration of a policy 
of"bridge-building" meant the rejection of both an 
alliance with the Atlantic great powers and Euro-
pean regional cooperation as official Norwegian 
foreign and security policy options. What remained 
of the ideas and the reality underlying the Atlantic 
policy, and why did the Norwegian government 
consistently reject the notion of regional Nordic or 
European cooperation? 
Conclusion: great power guarantees 
or small power cooperation? 
Although the idea of an Atlantic alliance which was 
inherent in Lie's Atlantic policy towards the end of 
the war was suspended in favour of "bridge-
building" as the declared Norwegian foreign policy 
doctrine, this did not mean that the basic assump-
tions about the need for some kind of American 
and British commitments to Norway's security 
were abandoned altogether. Towards the end of 
the war and in the early postwar years, the imple-
mentation of the original plans for Atlantic coop-
eration was not seen as indispensable. On the one 
hand functional ties, especially in military matters, 
could be further developed independently of 
political declarations or agreements. On the other 
hand the Norwegians were convinced that the 
western powers viewed Norway as belonging to 
their sphere of interest. Thus they expected the 
Western great powers to take an interest in the 
defence of Norwegian independence in their own 
interests. 
Thus the policy of bridge-building bears some 
obvious similarities to the neutralist sentiments of 
the 1930s and the traditional reliance on Britain's 
alleged "implicit guarantee". On the declaratory 
level, however, Norwegian foreign policy after the 
IFS lnfo 1/96 
Second World War was more ambitious than the 
policies of the 1930s. Prior to the war, Norwegian 
foreign policy initiatives, the country's active role 
in the League of Nations notwithstanding, reflected 
Norway's desire to keep the world of "great power 
politics" at a distance. Concomitant with the 
increasing international tension in the I 930s, 
moreover, Norway's policy in the League became 
increasingly dominated by efforts to limit the 
organisation's effective instruments of power. 
Norwegian policy in the United Nations was 
different. The Norwegians took an active part in 
the process leading up to its creation and later in 
the organisation itself, and in some crucial issues 
the Norwegian point of view departed from that of 
most of the other smaller powers.72 But the real 
differences between Norwegian foreign policy 
before and after the war should be sought some-
where else. In both periods involvement in the 
world organisation was only part, and not neces-
sarily the most important part, of the overall 
Norwegian foreign policy strategy. 
In the course of the war the Norwegian gov-
ernment established close political and military ties 
with the two western great powers. The declara-
tion of a policy of bridge-building towards the end 
of the war did not bring an end to these contacts. 
The "Atlantic policy" made operational would have 
meant the "implicit guarantee" of the prewar years 
was made explicit. The Norwegians stopped short 
of this, but political cooperation and strong "func-
tional ties" in the military field with Britain and the 
United States created an environment radically 
different from the semi-neutrality of the I 930s. 
The "implicit guarantee" of the I 930s lacked 
backing in the form of peacetime preparations for 
military assistance in times of war. After the 
Second World War, the step from "bridge-build-
ing" and non-aligned status to fully fledged partici-
pation in the North Atlantic alliance was facilitated 
by the continuation of extensive cooperation and 
contacts, political as well as military, between 
Norway and the western powers. 
In this lay the attraction as well as the limita-
tions of the Norwegian version of "bridge-build-
ing". It was not designed to provide security for 
Norway, i.e. to safeguard against the threat or use 
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of force by one of the remaining great powers. In 
case of a threat to Norway's security or integrity, 
the assumption of the "implicit guarantee" was still 
valid, and ideas of an "Atlantic policy" could easily 
be revived. 
The Norwegian government's opposition during 
the war to schemes of European regional coopera-
tion reflected Norwegian foreign policy traditions. 
During the war, however, the Norwegian attitude 
clarified and some of the assumptions underlying 
Norwegian policies were made explicit. The 
Norwegians did not oppose regional arrangements 
as such, but they rejected the idea of purely 
European or even continental solutions. For them 
the most important thing was to secure the partici-
pation of the major Atlantic power. Before the war 
this role was assigned to Great Britain; towards the 
end of the war and afterwards to the United States. 
In the discussions about Nordic cooperation, 
the Norwegians feared that a partnership with the 
economically and militarily stronger Sweden would 
create an unequal alliance with Norway in the role 
of a junior partner. It may seem paradoxical that 
the Norwegians seemed to be more apprehensive 
about being dominated by Sweden than about the 
obvious inequality inherent in schemes involving 
the major great powers. 
Strategic considerations, as discussed in this 
article, provide part of the answer to this apparent 
paradox. The Nordic countries, it was argued, 
could not muster the strength to present a credible 
deterrence or the ability to repel an aggressor. 
Further elements of the answer may be sought in 
the nature of the security arrangement the Norwe-
gians wanted. Nordic cooperation would have 
meant a system of mutual obligations and commit-
ments of principally equal partners. The Norwe-
gians felt, however, that the equality would be 
symbolic rather than real, and that Sweden would 
want to capitalise on the system to secure for itself 
a dominant position in the region. They feared, 
moreover, that Norway could be drawn into 
possible conflicts in the Baltic region. 
At the core of the Atlantic orientation, on the 
other hand, was the search for great power 
security guarantees, i.e. a fonnalisation of the 
prewar assumptions about the interest of 
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the Atlantic great powers in upholding Norway's 
sovereignty and integrity. This did not necessarily 
entail the kind of mutual obligations, commitments 
and involvement which would be preconditions for 
a Nordic arrangement. Norway did not want to 
engage itself in the affairs of other small or me-
dium-sized powers, nor did it want its neighbours 
to interfere in the political routine of day-to-day 
affairs. And although Norway's relative influence 
in a great power alliance would be strictly limited, 
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most probably more so than if it opted for coop-
eration with smaller countries, this limited input 
would still be multiplied by the strength of the 
alliance and produce enhanced security for the 
country. The relatively greater influence in coop-
eration with the other Nordic countries would not, 
it was thought, pay off the same way. The Norwe-
gians preferred the position of a junior partner in an 
influential organisation rather than that of one 
among equals in an inferior system. 
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